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IDIOSYNCRATIC DEALS FROM A DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE: 
EXAMINING CO-WORKERS’ VOICE BEHAVIOR  
 
ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on a third-party perspective of idiosyncratic deals (i-deals). More specifically, 
we look into the differential judgments co-workers make about i-deals in their work environment, 
as well as their reactions. Based on equity theory, we examine to what extent the content of the i-
deal and the work context (i.e., the functional dependence between co-worker and i-dealer) explain 
co-worker judgments regarding i-deal fairness in addition to subsequent voice behavior (i.e., 
complaining and/or requesting compensation). A vignette study with 1,988 respondents shows that 
when i-deals are considered distributively unfair, co-workers try to restore equity through voice 
behavior, thereby making the i-deal less effective. Furthermore, i-deals spark more distributive 
injustice perceptions and voice behavior in a highly interdependent work context. Finally, on 
average, financial bonuses were considered most distributively unfair and, thus, trigger more voice 
behavior. These results have important implications for i-deal literature as they uncover the criteria 
that co-workers use to judge i-deals and shape their reactions.  
Keywords: Distributive justice, Equity, Idiosyncratic deals, I-deals, Voice, Co-worker reactions 
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INTRODUCTION 
A decade ago, Rousseau (2005) put forward the idea of i-deals as a means to attract, motivate 
and retain valuable employees. I-deals are individually negotiated arrangements unique to one 
employee (the i-dealer), including, for example, unique financial rewards, flexibility or 
responsibilities (Rousseau et al., 2006; Rosen et al., 2013). I-deals have been shown to benefit both 
i-dealers and organizations by reducing work-family conflict and fostering organizational 
citizenship behavior, commitment, engagement, job satisfaction, job performance and proactive 
behavior (for a meta-analytical review, see Liao et al., 2016). It has been argued that these benefits 
result from an increased amount of trust and a stronger social exchange relationship, which triggers 
employees’ reciprocation, positive emotions and strong feelings of organization-based self-esteem 
(Hornung et al., 2010; Ng and Feldman, 2010; Liu et al., 2013). This suggests that organizations 
can derive a substantial return on investment by investing their resources in a limited amount of 
valuable or talented employees through the use of i-deals. Thus, from a utilitarian perspective, 
which focuses on efficiency and maximizing benefits (Kujala et al., 2011), i-deals can be fruitful 
for organizations.  
However, i-deals also create inequalities at work by granting one employee a certain outcome 
that his or her co-workers, by definition, do not have (Lai et al., 2009). Hence, i-deals also involve 
co-workers as key stakeholders who are likely to develop judgments about the i-deal and react 
accordingly (Greenberg et al., 2004; Lai et al., 2009; Rousseau, 2005). To study the co-worker side 
of i-deals, a distributive justice perspective (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2004; Lai et al., 2009) that has 
been widely researched in both the domain of organizational behavior (e.g., Holtz and Harold, 
2013) and in (business) ethics (e.g., Kim et al., 2015) has been put forward. Distributive justice 
theory argues that organizations should strive towards a distribution of resources that is considered 
equitable or fair, a state that is reached when an employee experiences the ratio between his/her 
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work inputs (e.g., work effort) and outputs (e.g., rewards) to be in balance with that of other 
employees (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). An i-deal could jeopardize this equity balance in 
the eyes of co-workers as it changes the i-dealer’s work inputs (e.g., makes his/her job easier) 
and/or outputs (e.g., increases his/her rewards) (Rousseau, 2005). In addition, the co-workers’ work 
inputs and outputs can be affected when the i-deal burdens them with extra work or reduces their 
chances of attaining desirable outcomes (Greenberg et al., 2004). Accordingly, Lai et al. (2009) 
argued that more favorable perceptions of equity could explain why a bond of friendship between 
the i-dealer and co-worker, as well as a co-worker’s belief of having the opportunity to obtain a 
similar arrangement in the future, increases the acceptance of an i-deal. Yet, although the role of 
equity in explaining co-worker reactions has been repeatedly recognized (see also Greenberg et al., 
2004), it has not been explicitly tested, nor has the subsequent behavioral reaction of co-workers, 
which could downplay or even negate the i-deal’s benefits.  
As such, research that digs more deeply into the differential equity judgments co-workers 
make, how they are shaped and how co-workers subsequently react to them is sorely needed in 
order to advance our understanding of i-deals’ effectiveness. This study argues that the extent to 
which the i-dealer’s and co-worker’s work inputs and/or outputs change (and, by extension, the 
extent to which inequity perceptions are fostered) will depend on the specific content of the i-deal 
(i.e., a financial bonus, workload reduction or work-hour flexibility) and the work context (i.e., the 
functional dependence between i-dealer and co-worker). Moreover, in line with equity theory 
(Adams, 1965), a disruption of the input/output ratio is believed to spark reactions aimed at 
restoring equity. We concentrate specifically on voice behavior as a reaction, i.e., “actively and 
constructively trying to improve working conditions” (Rusbult et al., 1988, p. 601), as this co-
worker reaction is highly relevant from an organizational perspective. On the one hand, co-workers 
can use voice to (1) complain and harm the effectiveness of i-deals by changing its content or even 
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reversing it or (2) to negotiate a compensation that could potentially give rise to a “gold-rush” for 
compensation. On the other hand, it is actually a relatively constructive reaction because it gives 
employers the opportunity to resolve the issue. 
With this study, we contribute to the current literature in several ways. First, we dig into the 
determinants of the differential judgments co-workers make regarding i-deals, focusing specifically 
on the role of i-deal content and work context, grounding our predictions in equity theory. Second, 
we go beyond the previous research that focuses on the (non-)acceptance of i-deals by zooming in 
on a specific behavioral reaction that follow from co-workers’ judgment of the i-deal and can 
significantly reduce or even negate the i-deal’s effectiveness. Third, by conducting a vignette study, 
we limit interference from other contextual variables (apart from i-deal content and work context), 
a typical issue in cross-sectional survey research. This allows us to tease out the causal impact i-
deal content and work context have on co-workers’ judgments and voice behaviors. Finally, by 
considering the role of i-deal content and functional dependence in predicting co-workers’ voice 
behavior, we provide organizations with concrete insights on how to effectively implement i-deals.  
HYPOTHESES 
According to equity theory (Adams, 1965), employees have a natural tendency to engage in 
social comparison by comparing their work inputs (e.g., workload, effort, work hours, 
performance) with their work outputs (e.g., financial and non-financial rewards). To assess whether 
they are equitably or distributively fairly treated by their employer, employees subsequently 
compare this input/output ratio with their referent co-workers (Carrell and Ditrich, 1978). If 
employees feel under- or over-rewarded, equity can be restored by attempting to alter one’s own 
inputs/outputs and/or those of the referent colleague (Skiba and Rosenberg, 2011; Walster et al., 
1978). An i-deal is a unique reward or working condition allocated to the i-dealer, which has the 
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potential to alter the inputs or outputs of the i-dealer and co-workers and, subsequently, to distort 
the equity balance experienced by co-workers. Below, we argue how the i-deal content and the 
work context (i.e., functional dependence between the i-dealer and co-workers) influence co-
workers’ perceived equity balance and why they subsequently react with voice behavior (see Figure 
1). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
------------------------------- 
 
I-deal Content 
Rosen et al. (2013) argued that i-deals can take different forms: (1) task and work 
responsibilities (e.g., workload reductions, more challenging assignments), (2) financial incentives 
(e.g., bonuses, pay raises) and (3) work-hour and location flexibility (e.g., flexible work hours, 
working from home). In this study, we focus on three i-deals representing these different categories, 
i.e., a workload reduction, financial bonuses, and work-hour flexibility. All three arrangements 
have the potential to distort the equity balance and, hence, lead to perceptions of distributive 
injustice among co-workers. A workload reduction can be perceived as making the i-dealer’s work 
easier, thus reducing his/her input. Work-hour flexibility and financial bonuses can be viewed as 
rewards, thus increasing output (Baltes et al., 1999; Colella, 2001). In the first case, the i-dealer 
gets the freedom to decide his/her work hours, thereby improving his/her work-life balance. In the 
second case, the i-dealer receives direct cash.  
However, compared to work-hour flexibility and a workload reduction, we argue that a 
financial bonus is more likely to trigger perceptions of distributive injustice among co-workers. 
First, non-financial rewards, such as work-hour flexibility, feedback or job content, typically 
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accommodate a particular need that not every employee has to the same degree (Aguinis et al., 
2013). For example, work-hour flexibility and workload reductions are considered more important 
for employees that have a specific need tied to work-life balance or health issues (Hornung et al., 
2009). Money, in contrast, satisfies a wide range of needs as, among other things, it can help secure 
food, shelter, security, education, social esteem and status, which benefits all employees (Rynes et 
al., 2004). Accordingly, Rynes et al. (2004) concluded that financial rewards trigger stronger 
reactions, therefore having a higher (de)motivating effect on employees than non-financial rewards. 
Second, and more importantly, money has stronger implications for employees’ fairness 
perceptions. Money-priming theory argues that when money is made salient, employees develop a 
self-interest mindset, in which they seek to maximize their individual financial outcomes in relation 
to the input they deliver and, most importantly, in comparison to other, similar, employees (Beus 
and Whitman, 2015; Schuler and Wänke, 2016). In other words, money triggers a social 
comparison process evaluating fairness that increases the odds that distributive unfairness is 
perceived (Shin and Sohn, 2015). This is especially true and forceful when the differences are 
salient. For example, pay dispersion research has shown that differences in pay between employees 
that are at the same hierarchical level negatively affect employees’ perception of pay equity for 
those at the bottom of the pay scale, who feel disadvantaged (Trevor and Wazeter, 2006). Hence, 
a financial bonus increases the odds of perceiving a deviation from the equity balance, especially 
since the i-deal concerns a higher output or reward for the i-dealer, potentially putting co-workers 
in the disadvantaged position.  
Finally, money is a relatively scarce resource (Leventhal et al., 1980). By awarding money 
to the i-dealer, its availability for other purposes (e.g., for co-workers) is reduced, which further 
fosters distributive injustice perceptions (Colella, 2001). In sum, given the importance of financial 
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rewards and the psychological process resulting from the salience and scarcity of money, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. I-deals concerning a financial bonus will be considered more distributively 
unfair by co-workers than i-deals concerning work-hour flexibility and a workload 
reduction. 
Functional Dependence  
Functional dependence – also called task interdependence – refers to the degree to which 
employees are dependent on each other’s efforts and skills to successfully accomplish their work 
(Priesemuth et al., 2013). This can vary from low (e.g., a sales representative in charge of his own 
region or clients working independently from co-workers) to high (e.g., a product design team in 
which employees cannot perform their job adequately without the cooperation and effort of co-
workers) (Wageman and Baker, 1997). The interdependence between employees can affect co-
workers’ i-deal equity perceptions for two reasons. First, a dependent context goes hand-in-hand 
with a significant amount of interaction between employees, whom are often fairly similar in terms 
of role (Rousseau, 2005). Research on social comparison and cognitions shows that the amount of 
interaction and similarity between employees significantly increases the odds of social comparison 
(Ang et al., 2003). While a high amount of interaction increases the access to comparative 
information on employees’ input and output, a strong similarity between employees makes 
comparisons very relevant for assessing the fairness of one’s own situation (Goodman and Haisley, 
2007; Han and Bai, 2014). As a result, in a dependent context, differences in input or output become 
both highly salient and relevant, increasing the odds that a deviation from the equity balance – and, 
thus, distributive injustice – is perceived (Shin and Sohn, 2015), for example, as a result of an i-
I-deals, distributive justice and co-worker voice 
 
9 
 
deal. Accordingly, Ang et al. (2003) showed that differences in working conditions between foreign 
and local employees were more salient when employees were highly interdependent (as opposed 
to low interdependence). As a result, distributive justice perceptions were more strongly affected. 
Second, functional dependence also affects employees’ tolerance or preference for reward 
interdependence, i.e. collective versus individualized rewards. Compared to an independent work 
context, employees in a dependent context (e.g., a team context) rely more on equality as a guiding 
principle for assessing distributive fairness (Chen et al., 1998; Colquitt and Jackson, 2006). 
Similarly, Kirkman and Shapiro (2000) showed that employees are more receptive to reward 
interdependence in a task interdependent environment, as opposed to an independent one. As a 
result, individual rewards (as opposed to collective or equal rewards) were found to lower both 
performance and helping behavior in a highly interdependent work context (Bamberger and Levi, 
2009; Shaw et al., 2002). These results are attributed to the typical line-of-sight issue in a group of 
interdependent employees. Since the employees’ efforts are intertwined, it becomes particularly 
challenging to identify individual contributions and efforts and to tie them directly and fairly to 
individual rewards (Kirkman and Shapiro, 2000; Pizzini, 2010). In other words, when the 
functional dependence between employees is high, employees are more likely to consider equal 
outcomes or rewards to be fair. By their very nature, i-deals are therefore more likely to be 
considered distributively unfair in a dependent context, as they entail differential outcomes. As 
such, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2. Functional dependence is positively related to distributive injustice 
perceptions of i-deals among co-workers.  
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Finally, we also expect an interaction effect between functional dependence and i-deal 
content on distributive injustice perceptions. Functional dependence increases the odds that i-deals 
disrupt the coordination and allocation of work between employees and, therefore, create costs for 
co-workers, such as by increasing their workload or complicating the communication and 
coordination with the i-dealer (Rousseau, 2005; Lai et al., 2009). However, an i-deal’s disruptive 
potential depends not only on the functional dependence between employees, but also on its 
content. Arguments supporting this reasoning can be found in research on flexible work practices. 
For example, several studies have shown that managers are more hesitant to grant flexible 
arrangements that strongly alter employees’ time at work and workload because of their disruptive 
nature, especially in highly interdependent work environments where teamwork and coordination 
is essential (den Dulk and de Ruijter, 2008; Powell and Maniero, 1999). We can apply this “work 
disruption theory” (Powell and Maniero, 1999) to both flexibility and workload reducing i-deals 
and draw from research on flexible work practices to build our case.  
First, flexible work hours significantly reduce employees’ face time (Kossek and Van Dyne, 
2008), i.e. the time employees interact face-to-face. While this is less of an issue when employees 
work independently, in interdependent environments, this can create significant disruptions, as 
group coordination – which is essential for group performance – requires more effort (den Dulk 
and de Ruijter, 2008; Van Dyne et al., 2007). Hence, co-workers may feel that a flexibility i-deal 
increases their workload. Moreover, evidence was found that the more employees are seen 
spending time at work, the higher others typically consider their input and reliability, especially 
when face-to-face interaction is necessary, such as in an interdependent work environment (Elsbach 
et al., 2010). The reduced face time caused by a flexibility i-deal may therefore also lead to the 
belief among co-workers that the i-dealer’s input has decreased. As a result, functional dependence 
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will have negative implications for co-workers’ perceptions of equity or distributive justice in the 
case of a flexibility i-deal.  
Second, especially in an interdependent work environment, a workload reduction has direct 
disruptive consequences, as managers will need to reassign some of the i-dealer’s work to co-
workers in order to prevent group performance from declining (Powell and Maniero, 1999). 
Supporting this reasoning, managers were shown to be more hesitant towards flexible work 
practices that significantly reduce employees’ workload (den Dulk and de Ruijter, 2008; Powell 
and Maniero, 1999). Similarly, when outlining the cross-level effects of flexible work practices, 
Van Dyne et al. (2007) warn against the introduction of flexible work practices in a context that 
would increase co-worker workload, as this could increase co-worker resentment. Indeed, from an 
equity theory perspective, co-workers may feel that they need to deliver more input than before 
while the i-dealer’s input declines, leading to perceptions of inequity. Hence, functional 
dependence will have negative implications for co-workers’ distributive justice perceptions in the 
case of a work-hour flexibility i-deal. 
In contrast, for a financial bonus, the interdependence between employees matters less. The 
salience of money and its impact on distributive injustice will still be higher in an interdependent 
context due to an increased amount of employee interactions and the difficulty of legitimizing an 
individual financial bonus as individual contributions are difficult to identify. Yet, a financial bonus 
has no particular additional disruptive consequences for an interdependent employee group, such 
as an increase in workload or reduced facetime. Hence, for a workload reducing and work-hour 
flexibility i-deal, interdependence will have a stronger negative impact on distributive injustice 
perceptions (see Figure 1 for a visual representation).  
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Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between functional dependence and distributive 
injustice perceptions of i-deals among co-workers will be stronger for i-deals concerning 
workload reduction or work-hour flexibility than for a financial bonus. 
 
Co-workers’ Voice Behavior 
Employees who perceive their situation to be distributively unfair will take actions to restore 
equity. This can be done in two ways. First, the imbalance can be psychologically or cognitively 
resolved by justifying the inequity (e.g., minimizing one’s own inputs or exaggerating their own 
outcomes) or by convincing oneself that the inequity will resolve itself without one’s own 
interference (e.g., by the employer) (Walster et al., 1978). Second, employees can restore equity 
behaviorally by attempting to alter their own inputs and outputs and/or those of others (Skiba and 
Rosenberg, 2011). For example, employees can increase their own output by negotiating higher 
rewards, try to decrease the co-worker’s output by complaining to management or decrease their 
own input by reducing work effort.  
We specifically focus on co-workers’ voice behavior. Voice entails actual behavior aimed 
towards equity restoration which – in contrast to psychological/cognitive equity restoration – can 
actually affect i-deals’ implementation and reduce their benefits (e.g., by changing their content, 
reversing them or by giving rise to a compensation “gold-rush”). Moreover, through voice, co-
workers can change their own input/output ratio (e.g., by negotiating an arrangement or monetary 
compensation benefiting themselves) and/or the i-dealer’s ratio (e.g., by complaining in order to 
achieve a dismissal or i-deal change). In this way, voice captures the broad scope of equity theory 
predictions concerning the behavioral restoration of equity. Finally, voice is a constructive measure 
because it protects the employment relationship by attempting to improve current working 
I-deals, distributive justice and co-worker voice 
 
13 
 
conditions (Hagedoorn et al., 1999; Rusbult et al., 1988). By expressing voice, employees notify 
their employer of the problematic situation, which provides the organization the opportunity to 
restore equity and, in this way, potentially prevents harmful long-term consequences of this 
injustice (e.g., erosion of trust, work performance and organizational citizenship behavior; Cohen-
Charash and Spector, 2001). From an organizational perspective, this makes voice a highly relevant 
and “actionable” co-worker reaction. 
Above, we argued that i-deals can distort the equity ratio. According to equity theory, this 
distortion results in co-workers perceiving an i-deal to be distributively unfair, which subsequently 
triggers reactions aimed at restoring equity (Colella, 2001). Here, we argue that i-deals perceived 
as distributively unfair increase the odds that co-workers will raise their voice. In line with equity 
theory, we distinguish between voice behavior aimed at changing one’s own input/output ratio (i.e., 
requesting or negotiating a compensation) and aimed at altering the i-dealer’s ratio (i.e. 
complaining in an effort to change the i-deal to an acceptable arrangement or have it abolished). 
This leads us to hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 4: Co-workers’ perceptions of distributive injustice of i-deals are positively 
related to voice behavior, i.e., requesting compensation (H4a) and complaining (H4b). 
Hypothesis 5: Co-workers’ perceptions of distributive injustice mediate the relationship 
between (1) i-deal content and voice behavior (H5a), between (2) functional dependence 
and voice behavior (H5b) and between (3) the interaction of i-deal content and functional 
dependence, and voice behavior (H5c). 
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METHODOLOGY 
Procedure 
We made use of the vignette method. Vignettes, or scenarios, are defined as short descriptions 
of a hypothetical situation in which factors thought to be important for specific judgment-making 
processes are manipulated (Wason et al., 2002). After reading this description, respondents are 
asked to evaluate the situation and assess how they would react. Vignette studies have the 
advantage over surveys in that, by randomly allocating different versions of the same vignette, 
conclusions can be drawn on differences in judgment or actions caused by those factors, which 
differ across the versions without interference from other contextual variables, as these are kept 
constant (Wason et al., 2002; Yang and Dickinson, 2014). Due to this advantage, vignette studies 
are highly appropriate when it involves an examination of employee judgments and subsequent 
behavior (e.g., Fast et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2009).  
We developed a between-subjects design in which two factors (i.e., i-deal content and 
functional dependence) were manipulated. To achieve this, six vignettes were developed. 
Respondents were instructed to read a description of a work situation and to empathize as much as 
they could. Next, the vignette itself was displayed (see Appendix 1). The first paragraph (common 
to all versions) described a situation in which a colleague was granted an i-deal. The main i-deal 
characteristics were mentioned: it was stressed that this arrangement only applied to this particular 
colleague, and it was made clear that the arrangement was negotiated by the colleague and approved 
by the supervisor (thus benefiting (1) the colleague, as he/she requested it in the first place, and (2) 
the organization, as it was approved). The next two paragraphs concerned the manipulated 
information on content (an i-deal concerning work-hour flexibility, a workload reduction or  
financial bonus) and functional dependence (high versus low), leading to six different scenarios. 
Finally, some contextual information was provided that was kept constant across all versions in 
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order to ensure that it did not affect judgments of distributive injustice or voice reactions. 
Specifically, we kept other aspects of justice constant (i.e., procedural and interactional justice) by 
mentioning that the i-deal was communicated to all employees during a weekly team meeting, after 
which the opportunity was provided to ask questions. After reading the vignette, respondents were 
asked to report their judgment of the situation, as well as how they would react 
 
Pilot Study 
In order to test the clarity of the vignettes and the manipulation of our focal variables, the 
scenarios were pre-tested. We recruited 227 bachelor and master students and randomly assigned 
them to one of the six vignettes. The sample consisted of 70% women, and the average age 
amounted to 21.4 years (SD 2.26). Manipulation checks were introduced such that respondents 
were asked which type of i-deal was described in the vignette (a financial bonus, work-hour 
flexibility, workload reduction or ‘I don’t know’) and how dependent they were on the i-dealer in 
the execution of their work (on a scale from 1 = highly independent to 4 = highly dependent). 
Analyses showed that the manipulation undoubtedly succeeded. Respondents faced with a high 
functional dependence scenario perceived higher functional dependence (3.42) than the 
respondents with the low condition (1.12) (F = 1259.28, p < .001). Moreover, only 4 out of 227 
recalled the content of the i-deal incorrectly and were removed from the sample. Finally, the i-deal 
content did not relate to perceptions of functional dependence (F = 0.42, p > .05), nor did the 
manipulation of functional dependence relate to perceptions of content (phi coefficient = .11, p > 
.05).  
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Main Study 
Since the manipulations succeeded, the vignettes were kept as they were and were embedded 
in a wage survey, organized bi-annually by two widespread job magazines, provided to Belgian 
employees. Data from 1,988 respondents was collected online. Their average age amounted to 37.0 
years (SD 10.0), with an average organizational tenure of 7.9 years (SD 9.1). A total of 39.2% of 
the sample were female. Regarding education, 39.4% had earned a high school degree or less, 
30.8% had a bachelor’s degree and 30.0% held a master’s degree. Respondents worked in diverse 
functional domains, with the largest being operational departments (23.1%), administration/central 
services (14.7%), sales (12.5%), technical support (9.0%), and general management (8.2%). 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one scenario such that the study qualifies as a true 
experimental design in which groups can be considered pre-test equivalent (Field and Hole, 2003).  
 
Measures 
Distributive injustice. Distributive (in)justice measurements involve statements referring to 
the (un)fairness of an outcome (e.g., “my level of pay is fair,” Niehoff and Moorman, 1993). 
Therefore, we used three items to capture whether co-workers considered the i-deal to be unfair 
(e.g., “I think it is fair that my colleague got this arrangement” reverse coded, α = .93). This was to 
be answered on a 7-point Likert response scale, going from “I totally disagree” to “I totally agree.” 
Voice. In their voice measure, Rusbult et al. (1988) mentioned three important parties 
employees can address in order to express their discontent: their direct supervisor, their co-workers 
or higher management. We adopted this reasoning to the i-deal context such that co-workers could 
address several important parties in order to complain in an attempt to change or undo the i-deal: 
their direct supervisor, the i-dealer and higher management. Accordingly, we formulated three 
items tapping the extent to which each of these three parties would be addressed (e.g., “I will 
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address higher management to express my discontent,” α = .94). Next, in order to request 
compensation, a co-worker can either ask for an i-deal of his/her own or for monetary 
compensation. As such, we used two items capturing both options (e.g., “I will ask my supervisor 
for an exceptional arrangement that is beneficial to me,” r = .96, p < .001). All items were to be 
answered on a 7-point Likert response scale, ranging from “I totally disagree” to “I totally agree.” 
 
RESULTS 
Measurement Model 
We first assessed our measures by performing a CFA on all multi-item measures. This model, 
consisting of three factors (distributive injustice, complaining and requesting compensation), was 
evaluated using several goodness-of-fit indices (Bentler, 1990; Byrne, 2001) and produced an 
excellent fit: CFI (1.00), TLI (0.99), SRMR (0.01) and RMSEA (0.03). In addition, all observed 
variables had significant loadings on their respective factor, ranging from .67 to .93. We compared 
this model with alternatives (a one- and two-factor model) in order to ascertain that the three-factor 
model was in fact superior and that there was no substantial overlap between the concepts (Table 
1). All models were found to be substantially inferior to the three-factor model. Moreover, in a 
pairwise manner, we estimated three-factor models in which the correlation between two factors 
was constrained to one. This led to significant declines in model fit (Δχ²(1) ranging between 357.50 
and 993.54, p < .001), which suggests that the three factors are statistically distinct from each other. 
As such, we obtained a valid measurement model and no general factor emerges from our data 
which reduces the chances of common method bias significantly. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------- 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. As our data consisted of both dichotomous and 
continuous variables, phi coefficients and point biserial correlations were used next to the Pearson 
correlation measure. The results show positive correlations between distributive injustice and both 
voice behaviors (complaining: r = .62, p < .001; requesting compensation: r = .14, p < .001). 
Moreover, functional dependence is positively correlated with distributive injustice (r = .25, p < 
.001). Finally, a workload reduction i-deal was negatively correlated with distributive injustice (r 
= -.17, p < .001), while a financial bonus showed a positive correlation (r = .15, p < .001).  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------------- 
Analyses 
As our model contained a mediating mechanism and the variables were measured with 
multiple items, we performed structural equation modeling in order to test the model in its entirety1. 
Two structural equation models were estimated in MPLUS, the first one testing the independent 
effects of i-deal content and functional dependence on co-workers’ voice mediated by distributive 
injustice (hypothesis 1, 2, 4a, 4b, 5a and 5b) and the second one testing the interaction between i-
deal content and functional dependence on co-workers’ voice mediated by distributive injustice  
(hypothesis 3 and 5c).  
Model 1. The first model yielded a satisfactory fit: CFI (0.96), TLI (0.95), SRMR (0.04) and 
RMSEA (0.07). However, the modification indices suggested that adding the direct paths between 
functional dependence and co-workers’ voice would improve the model significantly. These direct 
                                                          
1 More simple analyses, such as anova-tests and regression analyses, led to the same conclusions as the structural 
equation analyses and are available upon request. 
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paths suggest that equity theory cannot fully account for the impact of functional dependence. As 
this has important and accountable theoretical implications for the discussion concerning co-worker 
reactions to i-deals, we added these direct paths in a stepwise manner. The χ² difference tests 
showed that adding both direct paths yielded the best fit (CFI = .97; TLI = .96; SRMR = .03; 
RMSEA = .06). The results of this final model are depicted in Figure 2.  
Confirming hypothesis 1, respondents who were faced with a workload reducing i-deal (β = 
-.22, p < .001) or work-hour flexibility (β = -.09, p < .001) considered this less distributively unfair 
than a financial bonus. In addition, a Wald chi-square test of parameter equalities showed that the 
coefficient of a workload reducing i-deal was found to be significantly stronger than work-hour 
flexibility (Δχ² = 90.28, p < .001). Hence, distributive injustice perceptions are highest for financial 
bonuses, followed by work-hour flexibility and then by workload reduction. Secondly, confirming 
hypothesis 2, functional dependence had a positive effect on distributive injustice (β = .25, p < 
.001). Finally, distributive injustice is positively related to both “requesting compensation” (β = 
.11, p < .001) and “complaining” (β = .67, p < .001), confirming both hypotheses 4a and 4b. 
Moreover, through a Wald chi-square test of parameter equalities, we found that distributive 
injustice has a stronger influence on complaining than it does on requesting compensation (Δχ² = 
373.05, p < .001).  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
------------------------------- 
Next, we verified whether distributive injustice is a significant mediator. First, tests of 
indirect effects in MPLUS showed that all indirect paths were significant (estimate column in Table 
3). In addition, bootstrapping (k = 10,000) was used to obtain 95% confidence limits for these 
indirect relationships (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). All indirect relationships did not contain zero in 
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the 95% confidence interval (lower/upper columns in Table 3), except for the indirect relationship 
between a work-hour flexibility i-deal and requesting compensation. As such, we found substantial 
evidence that distributive injustice is a significant mediator in the relationship between i-deal 
content (H5a) and voice, and between functional dependence (H5b) and voice. However, for 
functional dependence, the mediation is only partial.  
Finally, considering our large sample size, which would easily flag small effects as 
significant, we tested effect sizes. For distributive injustice and requesting compensation, the effect 
sizes were in the medium range, as the R² estimates were, respectively, .10 and .08 (see Figure 2). 
For complaining behavior, however, the effect size was considerably larger (R² = .52). Moreover, 
we calculated the k² measure in order to capture the indirect effect sizes (Preacher and Kelley, 
2011) (see Table 3). For complaining behavior, the indirect effect sizes were medium to large, 
varying between .09 and .19. Hence, they are of particular practical relevance. In contrast, for 
requesting a compensation, the indirect effect sizes were low to medium, varying between .01 and 
.03. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 here 
------------------------------- 
 
Model 2. In a second model, we tested the interaction between i-deal content and functional 
dependence. We specified a three-group SEM model in which the groups represented the three 
types of i-deals. For each group, the impact of functional dependence on voice behavior was 
estimated mediated by distributive injustice (cf. H3 and H5c), albeit partially, as the results from 
model 1 revealed a partial mediation. Through pairwise Wald chi-square tests of parameter 
equalities, we verified whether the impact of functional dependence on distributive injustice, 
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complaining or requesting compensation differed between the three groups. This revealed several 
interesting and significant results (see Figure 3). Regarding the impact of functional dependence 
on distributive injustice perceptions, we only found a significant difference between i-deals 
concerning work-hour flexibility (β = .30, p < .001) and workload reduction (β = .20, p < .001) 
(Δχ² = 4.51, p < .05). This seems to contradict hypothesis 3, as we predicted a stronger impact of 
functional dependence for workload reduction and flexibility i-deals as compared to financial 
bonuses. However, this higher distributive injustice of a work-hour flexibility i-deal does not 
translate into a higher chance of complaining behavior or of requesting a compensation. In fact, the 
indirect relationships between functional dependence and both voice reactions are essentially the 
same (Δχ²(complaining) = 1.43; Δχ²(requesting compensation) = 2.17; both p > .05) for flexibility 
and workload reducing i-deals.  
We did, however, find the indirect relationship between functional dependence and 
requesting compensation via distributive injustice to be stronger for a workload reducing i-deal (β 
= .05, p < .05) than for a financial bonus (β = -.02, p > .05) (Δχ² = 10.68, p < .05) (cf. H5c). 
Moreover, functional dependence has a larger direct impact on complaining for a workload 
reducing i-deal (β = .19, p < .001) as compared to a financial bonus (β = .10, p < .001) (Δχ² = 3.96, 
p < .05). While we did not find similar results for a flexibility i-deal as compared to a financial 
bonus, the two latter findings are in line with our prediction that, as opposed to a financial bonus, 
a workload reducing i-deal is more disruptive for co-workers and will therefore trigger more 
negative reactions from them in a functional dependent context. However, we found this to be more 
visible in the resulting voice reactions than in the distributive injustice perceptions. In sum, the 
evidence for hypothesis 3 and 5c is somewhat mixed, as we found no support for our predictions 
concerning distributive injustice, though we did find modest evidence in terms of the (indirect and 
direct) impact of functional dependence on voice.  
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Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of our results and rule out alternative explanations, we performed 
several additional analyses (see Appendix 2 for detailed results). First, since we randomly assigned 
vignettes across participants, groups can be considered pre-test equivalent, eliminating the need for 
using control variables (Field and Hole, 2003). However, since justice research has shown that 
variables such as age, gender and educational level can be related to (in)justice perceptions, we 
also performed analyses with these control variables (e.g., Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). 
Including them in the main model (Model 1) does not significantly alter our results, which suggests 
that omitting these control variables did not affect our results.   
Second, the potential lack of vignette realism could have influenced our results (Yang and 
Dickinson, 2014). Following previous experimental work on voice behavior (e.g., Kim et al., 2009), 
we asked respondents whether the situation described in the vignette seemed likely to occur in their 
own work environment (7-point scale going from “entirely unlikely” to “very likely”). The 
likelihood increases the realism of the scenarios and, subsequently, respondent involvement in the 
study and their familiarity with their role in the scenarios (Greenberg and Eskew, 1993). We added 
this as a control variable to our main analysis (Model 1). We found that the results – and, thus, the 
conclusions drawn – remained unchanged. Moreover, estimating an interaction with plausibility 
for each specified path resulted in only one significant finding: a stronger impact was found of 
functional dependence on requesting compensation for those considering the situation to be likely, 
as opposed to those considering it unlikely (β = .09, p < .05). The impact of functional dependence 
on requesting compensation could therefore have been slightly underestimated due to a significant 
part of the respondents finding the situation to be unlikely. However, all conclusions drawn from 
the results still hold, regardless of scenario plausibility.  
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Third, we tested the respondents’ familiarity with i-deals by asking them whether they have 
negotiated an i-deal with their current employer either prior to (at the time of hiring) or during their 
employment (yes or no). Again, we added this as a control variable to our main analysis (Model 1) 
and found exactly the same results. Next, we split our sample into two groups distinguishing 
between those reporting to have negotiated an i-deal (n = 698) and those that did not (n = 1,290). 
We ran the structural equation model and performed Wald tests of parameter equalities across the 
two groups. We found no significant differences between both groups (Δχ² values ranging from 
0.00 to 2.63, p > .05), suggesting that the respondents’ (un)familiarity with i-deals has not biased 
our results. 
Finally, since the vignette study was part of a larger wage study, the study could have 
particularly drawn respondents who were focused on pay. Respondents who were particularly 
dissatisfied with their current pay could be responsible for the finding that financial bonuses are 
considered the least distributively fair. In order to check this, we added pay satisfaction (on a scale 
from 1 to 10, how satisfied are you with your pay?) as a control variable. This did not alter the 
relationship between the type of i-deal and distributive injustice. Moreover, adding pay satisfaction 
as a moderator in the relationship between the type of i-deal and distributive injustice did not result 
in a significant interaction. As such, we conclude that the respondents’ affective feelings towards 
pay (reflected in pay satisfaction) do not account for the finding that financial bonuses are 
considered the least distributively fair. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our results have major implications and emphasize the need to further disentangle the third-
party perspective of i-deals in order to understand the effectiveness of such arrangements. Through 
the use of vignettes or scenarios, which reduces the interference of contextual variables typically 
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present in cross-sectional survey research, we were able to tease out a few criteria that co-workers 
use in order to make judgments concerning i-deals and which shape their reactions. First, 
distributive injustice perceptions are contingent on i-deal content and work context (i.e., functional 
dependence between co-worker and i-dealer). On average, financial bonuses are considered the 
least fair, followed by work-hour flexibility and workload reductions. Equity theory accounts for 
this, as we argued that the salience of money triggers a social comparison process in which 
employees seek to maximize their own outcomes and, to that end, compare their own inputs and 
financial outcomes with those of referent others (Beus and Whitman, 2015; Schuler and Wänke, 
2016). Moreover, money is a particular sensitive matter because, compared to non-financial 
rewards, it has the potential to satisfy a wide range of needs (Rynes et al., 2004). As a result, equity, 
or fairness, is less favorably perceived.  
Contrary to our expectations, however, we found that workload reducing i-deals are judged 
significantly fairer than work-hour flexibility i-deals. A potential explanation might be that a 
workload reduction is perceived as accommodating a specific need that is outside of the i-dealer’s 
control, e.g., health issues, a sick spouse, childcare issues, elderly parents and so on. Because of 
these extenuating circumstances, the arrangement could be considered more legitimate or fair 
(Colella, 2001), as well as a sign that the employer cares about employees’ well-being. Concerning 
the work context, our results show that when co-workers depend on the i-dealer for work execution, 
an i-deal is considered less distributively fair. This finding reflects the notion that employees in 
interdependent environments are less tolerant of individualized rewards and prefer reward 
interdependence or group rewards, as individual contributions that would justify this preferential 
treatment are difficult to identify (Kirkman and Shapiro, 2000; Pizzini, 2010). Hence, apart from 
the i-deal content, the structure of work plays a critical role for co-workers when judging i-deal 
fairness.  
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Next, we found that i-deal content and functional dependence interact in their influence on 
co-workers. Contrary to what we expected, we only observed a stronger impact of functional 
dependence on distributive injustice perceptions for work-hour flexibility as compared to workload 
reduction. This suggests that respondents may have expected a higher impact on (the planning of) 
their work in the case of flexible work hours, as opposed to a workload reduction. Indeed, one 
employee in a highly interdependent team who is capable of choosing his/her working hours freely 
while others work on a fixed time schedule could create more (unpredictable) planning and 
performance issues, as opposed to a workload reduction in which additional tasks can be reassigned 
and distributed across employees in a structural manner. However, in line with our logic that 
workload reductions potentially disrupt work and trigger negative reactions, we found that 
functional dependence prompts more complaining behavior for workload reducing i-deals (β = .19, 
p < .001) than financial bonuses (β = .10, p < .01) (irrespective of distributive injustice perceptions). 
In sum, because workload reductions might be perceived as solutions to legitimate problems (cf. 
supra), functional dependence might matter less in predicting distributive injustice. Nonetheless, 
co-workers seem to be more prone to counteract by complaining or requesting a compensation for 
the potential extra work.  
Second, we established that i-deals that are perceived as distributively unjust can trigger voice 
behavior among co-workers in an attempt to restore equity. Although considered to be a 
constructive reaction (e.g., Rusbult et al., 1988), voice can render the i-deal ineffective and can 
ultimately have a substantial impact on the work group, depending on the subsequent managerial 
reaction to this behavior. If conceded to by management, complaining behavior potentially reduces 
or even eliminates the win-win situation that the i-deal was meant to create. The win for the i-
dealer, i.e. the arrangement itself, loses value. As a result, its motivating power decreases, as does 
the employer’s win (Rousseau, 2005). Next, granting a compensation can give rise to a “gold-rush” 
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on i-deals or other compensations. If management complies and everybody (or many employees) 
gets an i-deal or compensation, the unique nature of an i-deal disappears. As this unique nature is 
the source of the i-deal’s motivational power, and subsequently of the fruitful outcomes for the 
organization, a “gold-rush” is pernicious from an organizational point of view. First, the likelihood 
of desired employee outcomes and benefits decreases or even becomes zero. Second, both financial 
(in the case of many financial bonuses) and/or coordination (in the case of many workload 
reductions or a lot of work-hour flexibility i-deals) costs increase. In sum, the return on investment 
will be low, if not zero. In addition, conceding to these complaints or compensation requests may 
not necessarily safeguard a work group from the negative impact of an unfairly perceived i-deal. 
Co-workers can still experience less trust in their employer who unfairly granted the arrangement 
in the first place and may even be extra vigilant in the future when assessing the equity of 
arrangements. Similarly, however, if management does not concede, co-workers may perceive a 
lack of trust in the employer, which in the long run will lead to more destructive reactions, such as 
turnover (intentions) (Costigan et al., 2011). Moreover, such a breach in trust is difficult to restore 
and requires substantial time, effort and resources (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009). Therefore, our 
results show the importance of looking beyond the mere judgments of co-workers, as especially 
the behaviors resulting from their judgments determine i-deal effectiveness. 
Finally, interestingly enough, the effect of distributive injustice perceptions is most strongly 
visible in complaining behavior, rather than in attempting to improve one’s own situation through 
the negotiation of a compensation. A potential explanation can be found in psychological contract 
theory and the Belgian culture in which this study was performed. Psychological contract theory 
argues that employees have implicit expectations of what the organization brings to the 
employment relationship in exchange for what the employee provides (Morrison and Robinson, 
1997). When employees perceive this contract to be breached (e.g., because they feel distributively 
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unfairly treated), emotional reactions typically associated with psychological contract violation can 
ensue (e.g., anger, disappointment, frustration) (Kickul, 2001; Morrison and Robinson, 1997). This 
has behavioral implications (e.g., voice behavior) (Ng et al., 2014). Yet, recent research has shown 
that employees’ reactions to psychological contract breach depend to some extent on the 
employment relationship’s cultural components (Zagenczyk et al., 2015). Belgium is characterized 
by a strong tradition of collective negotiations for employment benefits and conditions done by 
unions in order to ensure equality (Sels et al., 2000). As such, this cultural component of the 
employment relationship could primarily steer employees towards complaining, thereby attempting 
to undo an unfairly granted i-deal (benefiting all co-workers) rather than individually negotiating a 
compensation (which benefits only them and potentially further reinforces the inequality between 
employees).  
 
Limitations  
This study is not without its limitations. First, given the lack of validated scales measuring 
voice behavior in an i-deal context, we developed these measures ourselves, albeit based on existing 
measures. We opted to write a limited but easy-to-understand number of statements describing the 
exact behavior we had in mind. According to Rossiter (2002), a limited number of clear statements 
is sufficient to validly measure behavioral reactions that are concrete and singular (i.e., related to 
one type of specific behavior). The factor analyses also showed that the measures used (i.e., 
complaining, requesting compensation and distributive injustice) represented three distinct and 
valid factors, thereby strengthening our belief in the validity of the measures.    
Second, the study focuses on a snap shot of a situation in the sense that respondents are given 
a hypothetical situation and are asked to respond immediately. Although there is evidence of a 
“primacy effect,” which means that employees mainly use the first information they have in order 
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to make a fairness judgment (Lind et al., 2001), time could still play a substantial role. It is not 
unthinkable that co-workers who respond negatively at a first glance could come around over time, 
for example, because time allows them to put the i-deal into perspective and can cause them to see 
a bright side that they did not see at first (e.g., the potential for them to negotiate an i-deal in the 
future). Alternatively, negative co-worker reactions could also worsen, for example, when the i-
dealer starts showing negative behavior towards his or her co-workers in response to the i-deal 
(e.g., bragging, taking advantage of his/her privilege). As such, we would encourage future research 
to approach the dynamics of i-deals longitudinally. 
Third, this study implicitly assumed that i-deals are communicated openly to co-workers. 
Employers may, however, knowingly choose to keep i-deals under the table. This could be seen as 
a way to avoid negative reactions in the workplace by downplaying social comparison (Colella et 
al., 2007; Rousseau, 2005). Moreover, secrecy can enhance the i-dealer’s sense of privacy, 
especially when the i-deal results from individual issues (e.g., physical, mental or work-life balance 
problems). However, granting an i-deal behind closed doors might not necessarily guarantee that it 
will stay there. Day (2012) showed that the presence of pay secrecy policies was not associated 
with less discussion among employees concerning pay. Future research could examine whether 
secrecy pays off or not and how co-workers react if they find out about said secret. Negative 
reactions are very likely in the latter case as the under-the-table nature will stimulate perceptions 
of favoritism or preferential treatment, as well as signal a lack of justice to co-workers (Rousseau, 
2005). 
 
Future Research Implications 
The results in this study offer some interesting avenues for future research. First, our results 
suggest that how co-workers judge i-deal fairness and subsequently react cannot be separated from 
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the i-deal’s content or work context. Therefore, future research examining a third-party perspective 
of i-deals needs to take into account both i-deal content and work context and could further dig into 
other factors influencing the judgments employees make about i-deals and their legitimacy. On the 
results regarding workload reduction, for example, it might be interesting to study the extent to 
which co-workers attribute the i-deal to an accommodation for a pertinent need, a compensation 
for high performance or an act of favoritism, as this attribution will probably influence their 
judgment.  
Second, equity theory can only partly explain why functional dependence affects co-workers’ 
voice. Therefore, our singular focus on distributive justice might have been too restricted. 
Procedural fairness, i.e., “the perceived fairness of the process by which outcomes were arrived at” 
(Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001, p.279) could also play a mediating role in the relationship 
between functional dependence and voice. Two major drivers of procedural justice are (1) 
consistency and (2) representativeness of the decision-making (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001; 
Leventhal, 1980). Consistency refers to “consistency of decisions across time and persons” and 
representativeness refers to “taking into account the needs, values, and outlooks of all the parties 
affected by the decision,” which implies employee input (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001, p. 
280). Both factors are highly relevant in a functionally dependent context. First, due to increased 
social comparison and the higher importance of equality in an interdependent environment 
(Colquitt and Jackson, 2006), the inconsistency in decision-making created by an i-deal is more 
likely to be salient. This inconsistency salience could trigger negative procedural fairness 
judgments, as well as subsequent voice behavior. Second, because interdependency increases the 
odds that an i-deal creates costs for co-workers or disrupts work, co-workers could attach more 
importance to being asked for their opinion or input before an i-deal is being granted because of 
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the representativeness rule. As there was no room for employee input before the decision was made 
in the vignettes, this could also cause procedural injustice and voice behavior.  
Leader-member exchange theory puts forward another potential explanation. In a high quality 
leader-member exchange relationship, an employee typically receives more resources from his/her 
supervisor than other employees and, therefore, feels like a valuable member of the in-group 
(Dulebohn et al., 2012). Previous research on i-deals has already shown that a high quality 
exchange relationship increases the odds that an employee receives an i-deal (Hornung et al., 2010; 
Rosen et al., 2013). However, as the i-dealer is the only one to receive this arrangement, the i-deal 
could also affect co-workers’ perceptions of their supervisor exchange relationship, albeit 
negatively, especially in an interdependent environment in which equality is preferred. Since they 
did not receive this particular arrangement, they might perceive a lower quality relationship, thus 
decreasing the degree to which they feel valued, supported and trusted. This could ensue counter 
reactions, e.g. voice, and reinforces the need to look at other theoretical perspectives and mediating 
variables (apart from distributive justice) in the relationship between i-deals and co-worker 
reactions. In sum, additional theorizing and empirical research is needed to further unravel why 
functional dependence drives co-workers’ voice behaviors. 
Third, we focused on voice which represents but one reaction in a wide range of potential co-
worker reactions. Neutral (e.g., mere acceptance) and positive (e.g., active support) reactions are 
not unthinkable and should be strived for. Positive spillover effects on co-workers might unlock 
these reactions. Rather than disrupting work, an i-deal might, for example, allow a crucial team 
member to perform better, spend more time on core tasks or prevent him/her from leaving, which 
benefits the entire team, especially when the team relies heavily on this member for certain tasks. 
In contrast, more destructive, negative reactions than voice (e.g., turnover, counterproductive 
behavior) are equally possible when spillover effects are highly disruptive. Hence, future research 
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should also take into account the exact spillover effects of i-deals on co-workers to further explain 
co-worker reactions. Especially in interdependent contexts, a more thorough and complex analysis 
of the tasks (and the interdependencies between employees) within a team might be required. For 
example, to identify the exact disruptive impact of a workload reducing i-deal, one could take into 
account (1) for which tasks employees are dependent on one another, (2) which task is affected by 
the i-deal and (3) whether there is a connection between the two. If the workload reduction does 
not concern a task that co-workers rely on to function as a team, the i-deal will have a low chance 
of disrupting co-workers’ work. In extremis, a workload reduction for a task that is independent of 
the team’s responsibilities, might even free up time for the i-dealer to work on the team’s core 
tasks, thereby triggering positive co-worker reactions.  
Finally, important to discern are the conditions under which co-workers decide to take 
destructive rather than constructive measures. Job satisfaction could play a significant role, as it 
generally decreases the odds of destructive responses in favor of constructive ones (Hagedoorn et 
al., 1999). Similarly, interactional justice could moderate the relationship between distributive 
justice and behavioral reactions (e.g., Skarlicki and Folder, 1997). If management treats co-workers 
with respect (interpersonal justice) and offers them information on the i-deal and why it was 
approved (informational justice), they perceive more systemic fairness (i.e., overall fairness of the 
organization; Beugre and Baron, 2001) and could therefore be more inclined to voice their 
complaints or request compensation because they believe that management will listen. Conversely, 
when interactions are considered unfair, co-workers might not believe that complaining or 
negotiating compensation would be successful, which is why they could be more inclined to resort 
to more destructive measures (e.g., retaliation) (Skarlicki and Folder, 1997). Finally, equity 
sensitivity could play a role. This reflects the degree to which employees are sensitive to under- or 
over-rewarded situations (Restubog et al., 2007). Benevolent employees focus on their relationship 
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with the employer and attach less importance to outputs. On the other hand, entitled employees 
emphasize their outcomes. Benevolent employees are therefore more tolerant to situations of 
inequity. In line with this reasoning, Restubog et al. (2007) found that benevolent employees 
display less counterproductive behavior when confronted with psychological contract breach than 
their entitled counterparts. As such, we could expect equity sensitivity to moderate the relationship 
between distributive injustice and behavioral reactions. 
 
Practical Implications 
Research on co-worker reactions to i-deals has practical relevance because these reactions 
can influence the overall effectiveness of i-deals. We found that co-workers could react by raising 
their voice to complain or request a compensation in an effort to restore distributive fairness. 
However, while voice is a constructive reaction, it can still reduce the effectiveness of i-deals and 
affect the functioning of the entire work group, regardless of whether the organization gives in to 
the complaint or request or not, as argued above. As such, it is important for (HR) managers and 
direct supervisors to consider the distributive fairness of an i-deal as well as potential co-worker 
reactions before granting an i-deal. Our results give some clarity concerning the conditions under 
which i-deals are considered less distributively fair and voice behavior is thus more likely to occur. 
First, an organization should take into account employee interdependency. In a highly 
interdependent context, treating all employees equally could be more effective. Alternatively, 
shifting the decision authority to the team rather than the supervisor such that the entire team 
collectively decides on working conditions or arrangements deviating from the standard could be 
a boundary condition that allows for successfully implementing i-deals in an interdependent team 
context. This would allow the team to reach a decision that they consider distributively just and 
acceptable. In addition, as they are given a say in the matter, procedural justice is also fostered. 
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Second, financial bonuses as i-deals can be harder to implement effectively, as they are more prone 
to spark voice reactions than i-deals concerning workload reduction and flexibility. However, i-
deals concerning workload reduction tend to spark more complaining behavior and requests for co-
worker compensation in a functional dependent context than a financial bonus does. This suggests 
that both the content of the i-deal and the circumstances in which it would be allocated should be 
taken into consideration before granting an i-deal.  
In summary, the results illustrate the tightrope managers have to walk in order to maximize 
both organization utility and employee justice. Based on organizational justice research, we suspect 
that interactional justice will play a key role in protecting this balance. Research suggests that fair 
interactions can mitigate the negative impact of unfairly or unfavorably perceived outcomes 
(Skarlicki and Folder, 1997). Thus, the more managers succeed in safeguarding interactional justice 
(e.g., by allowing co-workers to freely voice their concerns, treating them with respect and dignity 
and by providing them with legitimate information on why the i-deal was granted and deemed 
appropriate by the manager), the more likely it becomes that the negative impact of inequitably 
perceived i-deals will eventually be mitigated, even if they trigger voice behavior. 
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Table 1. Results of confirmatory factor analyses. 
 One factor model Two factor model 
(distributive injustice and 
voice) 
Three factor model (distributive 
injustice, complaining and requesting 
compensation) 
Chi² (df) 
CFI 
TLI 
RMSEA 
SRMR 
1766.75 (20) 
.80 
.72 
.21 
.12 
493.20(19) 
.95 
.92 
.11 
.07 
48.67(17) 
1.00 
.99 
.03 
.01 
ΔChi² (compared to the 
three-factor model) 
p-value ΔChi² test 
1718.08 
 
<.001 
444.53 
 
<.001 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.Distributive injustice 4.00 1.41 1       
2.Complaining 3.54 1.41 .62*** 1      
3.Requesting compensation 3.55 1.29 .14*** .37*** 1     
4.Functional dependence 0.49 0.50 .25*** .30*** .19*** 1    
5.Work hour flexibility 0.33 0.47 .03 .04 .00 .02 1   
6.Workload reduction 0.35 0.48 -.17*** -.18*** -.15*** -.03 -.51*** 1  
7.Financial bonus 0.32 0.47 .15*** .14*** .15*** .01 -.48*** -.50*** 1 
*** p < .001 
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Table 3. Indirect relationships: results of bootstrapping (k=10,000; 95% confidence interval) and effect sizes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; indirect relationships are non-significant when zero is part of the 95 percent confidence 
interval 
 
  
Independent variable 
Dependent variable 
Complaining Requesting compensation 
Lower 
2.5% 
Estimate Upper 
2.5% 
Effect 
size (k²) 
Lower 
2.5% 
Estimate Upper 
2.5% 
Effect 
size (k²) 
Functional dependence .14 .17*** .20 .19 .01 .03*** .05 .03 
Workload reduction -.18 -.15*** -.11 .18 -.04 -.03* -.01 .03 
Flexibility -.10 -.06** -.03 .09 -.02 -.01* -.00 .01 
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Figure 1. Overview of hypotheses 
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Figure 2. Structural equation modelling results for model 1 
 
Notes: *** p < .001 
a reference category: financial bonus 
Fit indices: CFI = .97; TLI = .96; RMSEA = .06; SRMR = .03 
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Figure 3. Results of multi-group structural equation modelling for model 2 
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APPENDIX 1: Overview of the different scenarios 
You are working, together with a number of colleagues, for the same 
supervisor (boss). Recently, one of your colleagues has struck a deal with your 
supervisor about an exceptional arrangement. This arrangement only applies 
to this particular colleague, not to you, nor to any other team member. 
Scenario 
introduction, 
common to 
all versions 
Either 
 
 
 
or 
 
 
or 
The arrangement implies that from now on your colleague can freely 
choose his or her working hours. However late your colleague arrives 
or early he or she leaves, your supervisor approves as long as your 
colleague works a normal amount of hours on a monthly basis.  
The arrangement implies that your colleague can take it easy for a 
while. He or she will work the same amount of hours as before, but 
his or her workload will be reduced. As long as the arrangement 
holds, your colleague will get fewer assignments.  
The arrangement implies that your colleague will receive a bonus at 
the end of each month, provided he or she performs exceptionally 
well. You, and your colleagues, keep working for a fixed wage. Your 
colleague can thus improve financially, but has to work hard for it.  
Manipulation 
of content – 
Flexibility 
 
Manipulation 
of content – 
Workload 
reduction 
Manipulation 
of content - 
Bonus 
Either 
 
 
or 
The work that your colleague does has no impact on your own work. 
Your work results do not depend on how well your colleague 
performs. In the past, when your colleague was absent for a while, 
your work was not disrupted or hindered. 
The work that your colleague does has a large impact on your work. 
Your results are strongly dependent on how well your colleague 
performs. In the past, when your colleague was absent due to 
sickness, your work was immediately disrupted or hindered. 
Manipulation 
of low 
functional  
dependence 
Manipulation 
of high 
functional 
dependence 
Your supervisor announced this arrangement last week during a team meeting, 
where everyone was offered the opportunity to ask questions. 
Context 
information, 
common to 
all versions 
of the 
scenarios 
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APPENDIX 2: Robustness checks 
Figure 2a. Control variables added to the main model: age, gender and educational level  
 
Notes: Only significant results are represented for the control variables. All control variables were 
regressed on distributive injustice, complaining and requesting compensation. 
1 Reference category: master degree 
* p < .05; *** p < .001 
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Figure 2b. Likelihood of the hypothetical situation added as a control variable to the main model  
  
Notes: *** p < .001 
 
Figure 2c. Having an i-deal of their own (yes/no) added as a control variable to the main model 
 
Notes: ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Figure 2d. Two-group model (group 1 respondents have an i-deal of their own; group 2 
respondents have no i-deal of their own) 
 
Notes: Coefficients group 1 / Coefficients group 2 
Differences between coefficients are calculated through Wald tests of parameter equalities 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Figure 2e. Pay satisfaction added as a control variable to the main model 
 
Notes: ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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